Courts--Province of Federal and State Courts--Questions of General Law--Validity of Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson (Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 13 
Number 1 Volume 13, November 1938, Number 
1 
Article 17 
May 2014 
Courts--Province of Federal and State Courts--Questions of 
General Law--Validity of Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson (Erie R. R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1938) "Courts--Province of Federal and State Courts--Questions of General Law--
Validity of Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson (Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))," St. John's Law Review: 
Vol. 13 : No. 1 , Article 17. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss1/17 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
and the group of people who would ordinarily rely upon it.19 The
law in New York as developed from the Ultranmres case and the in-
stant case may be summarized as follows:
1. In the absence of privity an accountant is not liable to third
persons for honest blunder, on the theory of negligence, because he
owes no duty of care.20
2. In the absence of privity an accountant is not liable to third
persons for gross negligence on the theory of negligence, because he
owes no duty of care.21 But he is liable to third persons on the theory
of deceit for gross negligence, because from this a jury may infer
fraud.22
3. Negligence, no matter how gross, is never equivalent to fraud
as a matter of law; it always remains a question of fact.23
R. A. K.
COURTS-PROVINCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS---QUES-
TIONS OF GENERAL LAW - VALIDITY OF DOCTRINE OF SWIFT V.
TysoN.-Plaintiff sues to recover for personal injuries allegedly sus-
equity * * * sue * * * (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him who has
with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement. * * * " (Italics ours.) This is, of course, subject to
certain enumerated defenses for wfiich see the Securities Act. However, under
the present law, the Securities Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C.
§ 78a (1934) 78r, the defendant may escape liability for a false or misleading
statement if he proves that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading.
"In REED, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF PUBLIc ACCOUNTANTS
(1935), an excellent book on the whole subject of liability of public accountants,
the author suggests: (1) If liability for mere negligence is to be extended it
should be limited to those persons the accountant knows will use his statements
for business transactions with his client. (2) That it would seem more just
for the courts to require a different degree of care to third parties where the
accountant's services are gratuitous. And (3) in the event of an extension of
liability, the defense of contributory negligence should still be available against
the third party. It is submitted that where an accountant knows that the
balance sheet he prepared will be used for credit purposes, and after he has
sent it to his employer he discovers that the condition of the items is not as
represented, he owes a duty not only to notify promptly his employer, but to
take reasonable steps to find out and notify every person who received a copy.
"' See cases cited supra notes 7, 8 and 9.
2 Ibid.
2Ibid.
mIbid.
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tained through negligent operation of a train.' Defendant contends
that according to the common law of Pennsylvania 2 plaintiff was a
trespasser, and by Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 3 applica-
tion of the Pennsylvania law was required. The trial judge, applying
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,4 stated that in matters of general law
the federal courts are free to disregard state courts' decisions. A ver-
dict for plaintiff Tompkins was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals r on the ground that federal courts, in the absence of a local
statute, are free to exercise their own independent judgment as to
matters of general law; and it is well settled that the question of a
railroad's liability for injuries caused by its servants is one of general
law.6 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court 7 and on
certiorari, held, reversed. The phrase "laws of the state" was meant
to include also the decisions of the state's highest tribunal, and there-
fore, the federal courts, in applying the Swift doctrine, were unconsti-
tutionally invading rights which were reserved to the states.8 Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
'One night Tompkins was walking along defendant's right of way in
Pennsylvania when he was struck by a door projecting from one of the defen-
dant's freight trains. The plaintiff contended that he was rightfully on the
premises as a licensee because of a commonly used footpath parallel to the
tracks.I acFalchetti v. Pa. R. R., 307 Pa. 203, 160 Atl. 859 (1932) ; Koontz v. B. &
0. R. R., 309 Pa. 122, 163 Atl. 212 (1932) (a person using a customary path-
way, parallel to the tracks, is a trespasser and thus the only duty owed is to
refrain from wilfully and wantonly injuring him).
' 1 STAT. 92, § 34 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1934) provides: "The laws of
the several states * * * shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at
common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
' 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842) (Decisions of courts do not constitute laws. They
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are).
90 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
'Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black. 418 (U. S. 1863).
"- U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 50 (1937).
'There were two concurring opinions in the instant case. One was by
Mr. Justice Butler in which Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred, and one by
Mr. Justice Reed. Mr. Justice Butler agreed in reversing the judgment because
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence but disapproved of changing the Swift
doctrine. He based his objections on five grounds: (1) Stare decisis (nearly
100 years of continuous use of the doctrine) ; (2) Congressional consent (by
implication because Congress had not changed the rule by legislation) ; (3) No
constitutional question was suggested or argued below or here. (Generally the
court will not consider any question not raised by the petition) ; (4) Congress
has not been represented in this case. (The case impliedly takes away from
Congress the power or right to pass any legislation which may reiterate the
Swift rule) ; (5) This case may be decided on other grounds. (Even if the
common law of Pennsylvania were applied in this case the plaintiff would have
lost because of contributory negligence, and this court, as is its custom, will
not hold legislation invalid, reason (4) upra).
Mr. Justice Reed, in his concurring opinion, objected to the majority
holding the Swift doctrine unconstitutional, "instead of merely erroneous. * * *
It seems preferable to overturn an established construction of an act of Con-
gress, rather than, in the circumstances of this case, to interpret the Consti-
tution".
[ VOL. 13
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Prior to 1842, federal courts, exercising diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, were bound by decisions of the highest state courts, if
there were such decisions, whether they rested upon local law or upon
general principles of common law.9 They even declared it their duty
to do so.10 Then in 1842 the case of Swift v. Tyson 11 decided that
statutes of the state, its constitution, or long established local customs
having the force of laws, are the only "laws of the state" intended by
the Judiciary Act. This was later amplified to include the state courts'
interpretations of their constitution or statutes (if no federal quesion
was involved) 12, and also all matters relating to the acquisition of, or
rights to, real property situated within the state.13 So the rule was
settled. In all matters of general commercial law the federal courts
were not bound to follow the state courts' decisions. But due to the
generality of the phrase "general commercial law" difficulty was met
with in the application of the rule. It was no longer a question of
whether the federal courts should follow the state courts when there
existed concurrent jurisdiction, but whether a given matter was one
of general or of local law.' 4 The federal courts, attempting to evade
as much as possible the state courts' decisions, have enlarged the field
of general law.'r General law has been held to include ecclesiastical
questions, 16 liability of a bank accepting commercial paper for collec-
tion,'7 validity of municipal corporation bonds,' 8 liability for punitive
or exemplary damages,' 9 stipulations limiting carrier's liability for
negligence,20 contracts generally,21 waiver of right to pursue tort rem-
edy,22 mental anguish,23 liability of master to fellow-servants, 24 negli-
0 Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344 (U. S. 1797) ; Smith v. Clapp, 15 Pet.
125 (U. S. 1841).
" Taylor v. Brown, 5 Cranch 234 (U. S. 1809) ; Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291
(U. S. 1832).
n16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
U. S. ex rel. Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (U. S. 1869) ; Webb v. So.
Ry., 235 Fed. 578 (S. D. Ala. 1916), rev'd, 248 Fed. 618 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918),
cert. denied, 247 U. S. 518, 38 Sup. Ct. 581 (1918).
.Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526 (1915).
"Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914 (1893).
Sharp and Brennan, The Application of the Ddctrine of Swift v. Tyson
Since 1900 (1929) 4 IND. L. J. 367.
" Sherard v. Walton, 206 Fed. 562 (W. D. Tenn. 1913).
'Taylor, etc., Co. v. Nat. Bank, 262 Fed. 168 (N. D. Ohio 1919).
'
5 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863).
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261
(1893).
20 Ibid.
' Delmas v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661 (U. S. 1872).
'Reynolds v. Trust Co., 188 Fed. 611 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911).
Western U. Co. v. Burris, 179 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
"Wabash R. R. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454, 2 Sup. Ct. 932 (1883).
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gence and contributory negligence, 25 construction of wills, 26 liability
under insurance policies, 27 and mineral conveyances.28
Uniformity of law throughout the nation, which was supposed to
be one of the attributes of the doctrine,29 was never accomplished. But
this was not the only defect of the doctrine. The more important one
was that it went contra to the raison d'etre of conferring jurisdiction
upon the federal courts because of diversity of citizenship. Such jur-
isdiction was given to the federal courts so that justice would be dis-
pensed upon the same principles upon which it was administered
between citizens of the same state,3 0 ergo, there would exist no dis-
crimination against the non-citizen. The Swift v. Tyson case so
abused this privilege that the citizen became the loser. The non-
citizen had the option of either a federal court or the state court, and
because of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, which gave rise in many in-
stances to conflicting views between state and federal courts in mat-
ters of general jurisprudence, a choice of a theory partial to his view-
point. The citizen had to rely upon his own state court's inter-
pretation.38
Consequently, there has been much said against the doctrine since
1845, advocating either a reversal or limitation. 32 Mr. Justice Field's
analogy in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R. v. Baugh 33
is worthy of mention: "When the Fourteenth Amendment ordains
that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction 'the
equal protection of the laws' it means equal protection not merely by
the statutory enactments of the State, but * * * by all the rules and
regulations which * * * govern the intercourse of its citizens with
each other and their relations to the public * * * "34 In Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co.35 Mr. Justice Holmes dissented and stated that
"the law of a state * * * does issue and has been recognized by this
court as issuing from the state courts as well as from the state legis-
latures * * * (it) does not become something outside of the state
court and independent of it by being called the common law." 36 Mr.
Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black. 418 (U. S. 1863); Hough v. Texas R. R.,
100 U. S. 213 (1880).
'Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464 (U. S. 1845).
'Equitable Life v. Nikilopulos, 86 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U. S. 660, 57 Sup. Ct. 436 (1937).
'Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140 (1910).
"See note 7 of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789(1923) 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 84.
"See note 9 of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
32 See notes 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
149 U. S. 368, 390, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 920 (1893).
"Id. at 398.
"215 U. S. 349, 370, 30 Sup. Ct. 140, 146 (1910).
"Id. at 372 (White and McKenna, JJ., concurred in this dissent).
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Justice Holmes dissented also in Black & White Taxicab and Trans-
fer Co. v. Brown & Yellow T. & T. Co.: 37 "If within the limits of
the Constitution a State should declare one of the disputed rules of
general law by statute there would be no doubt of the duty of all
Courts to bow * * *. I see no reason why it should have less effect
when it speaks by its other voice. If a state constitution should de-
clare that on all matters of general law the decisions of the highest
Court should establish the law until modified by statute or by a later
decision of the same Court, I do not perceive how it would be pos-
sible for a Court of the United States to refuse to follow what the
State Court decided in that domain. But when the constitution of a
State establishes a Supreme Court it by implication does make that
declaration as clearly as if it had said it in express words * * *." 38
No doubt all these dissenting opinions, in conjunction with the
extensive criticisms,39 have been responsible for the instant case, so
that we may now say that the lex loci would govern in all diversity
of citizenship suits in the federal courts where questions of general
jurisprudence arise. It is submitted that the instant case is only a
precursor, for there are many questions left unanswered. Is Congress
free to enact a law reiterating the Swift doctrine? Is equity involved?
If there are no statutes or decisions upon certain matters of general
law, will a Supreme Court decision be followed in a subsequent state
case, or will the state judges pride themselves on being able to over-
rule the United States courts? The answers to all these questions
must be left to the future. 40
A. M.A.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-SviET DECREES NATIONALIZING Rus-
SIAN INSURANCE COMPANIES-ASSIGNMENT OF ASSETS TO THE
UNITED STATES-EXTRATERRITORIALITY.-As a consequence of na-
tionalization by Soviet decrees in the years 1918 and 1919 of the
Russian insurance companies and the confiscation of their property,
cancellation of their debts, and extinguishment of the rights of share-
holders, there followed a liquidation of the American branches of the
Russian insurance companies here. However, because of the non-
recognition of Russia in 1931, the surpluses could not be remitted to
domiciliary receivers in that country. Lest the surpluses be lost, it
=276 U. S. 518, 532, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 408 (1928).
Id. at 534 (Brandeis and Stone, JJ., concurred in this dissent).
' See notes 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
' For recent criticisms of the instant case see Note (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 71; Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1336; Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal Jurisprudence? (1938) 26
A. B. A. J. 421.
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